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AUTHORIZATION OF AGENTS TO DEAL WITH
REAL ESTATE AS AFFECTED BY THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The courts have long recognized the possibility that the Statute of
Frauds could, under certain circumstances, operate as an instrument of
fraud.' From the time of the inception of the Statute in 1677, it was
acknowledged that the employment of an agent by one or the other of
the parties created a situation in which the opportunities for fraud
were manifold. One who happened to be intent upon the perpetration
of fraud might empower an agent to represent him in one of the transactions falling within the Statute, cloak such agent with every indication of full power to act in the principal's stead, short of a lawful
power, and subsequently, after the opposite party had been induced to
rely upon the supposedly good faith transaction, or when developments
proved the transaction non-beneficial to the principal, step out of the
contract with substantial immunity by pleading the Statute.2 Thus,
there emerged a conflict between the public policy which the Statute
was designed to protect and the good conscience of equity.3 Here we
shall attempt to analyze the impact of this conflict upon the law controlling the authorization of agents to deal with the real estate of their
principals.
The rather obvious possibilities of engineering a fraud by such a
device is the probable explanation for the fact that the original
Statute4 in England established a double-standard with respect to the
appointment of agents to act in transactions involving estates or interests in realty. In order to empower an agent to execute in his
principal's name an instrument creating, granting, surrendering or
assigning an interest in realty, a lawful authorization in writing was
required,5 whereas only a lawful authorization (presumably including
authorizations parol in whole or in part) was necessary in order to

' 3 POMEROY,
2Ibid.
3

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,

§921 (5th Ed. 1941).

Davis v. Dunnett, 239 N.Y. 338, 146 N.E. 620 (1925).

429 Charles II (1677) c. 3.
5 ". . . all Leases, Estates, Interests of Freehold or terms of years, or any un-

certain interest of, in to or out of any Messuages, Manors, Lands, Tenements,
or Hereditaments made or created by Livery and Seisen only or by Parole, and
not put into writinj and signed by the parties so making or creating the Same
or their Agents, thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the force
and effect of Leases or Estates at will only ...
"And moreover no Leases, Estates, Interests, either of Freehold, or terms of
years, or any uncertain interest of, in, to, or out of any [essuages, Manors,
Lords, Tenements or Hereditaments shall at any time hereafter be assigned,
granted or surrendered, unless it be by deed or note in writing, signed by the
party or parties so assigning granting or surrendering the Same, or their
agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, or by Act and operation of

Law." Ibfd.
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out by early interpretations of the statute.
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This was borne

"The statute of frauds does not require that the authority of the
even for the sale of lands should be in
agent contracting
' 7
writing.
The provision, of course, corresponds to that found in Section 240.08
of the Wisconsin Statutes and its subsequent interpretation, which
affirmed, as recently as 1952,8 the doctrine laid down in Dodge v.
Hopkins:
"The authority of the agent contracting to convey need not be in
writing, though that of an agent conveying must."9
It is of incidental interest to note that the provisions of the original
Statute respecting contracts to convey were not included within the
same sections as dealt with present conveyances of realty, but were,
instead, combined with the provisions of the Statute dealing with a
number of contract-rights which did not necessarily, or even commonly,
relate to interests in realty.' 0
The double standard so created has carried over into the Statutes of
a number of American jurisdictions," which, as pointed out above,
include Wisconsin. 12 Other jurisdictions of this country" have refused
.no action shall be brought to charge any executor or administrator upon
any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate, or whereby to
charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, or to charge any person on any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, or upon any contract for sale of
lands, tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them, or
upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year
from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by
the party to be charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him law-

6 "..

fully authorized." Ibid.

7 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 614 (1889); Coles v. Trecothick, 32 Eng. Rep. 592

(1804).
8 Zuhak v. Rose, 264 Wis. 286, 58 N.W. 2d 693 (1952).
9 Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686 (1861).
10 Supra, note 6.

(1937) §6059; GEORGIA, CODE ANNOTATED, §20INDIANA, BURNS' STATUTES ANNOTATED (1933) §33-101 (8045);
IOWA, CODE OF 1939, §11285; KENTUCKY, REVISED STATUTES 1942, §371.010
(470); MAINE, REVISED STATUTES (1930) Ch. 123, §1; MASSACHUSETTS, ANNOTATED LAWS, Ch. 259, §1; NEW JERSEY, STATUTES ANNOTATED, §25: 1-5;
NORTH CAROLINA, CODE OF 1939, §988; OHIO, PAGE'S GENERAL CODE ANNOTATED,
§8621; SOUTH CAROLINA, CODE OF 1942, §7044; TENNESSEE, WILLIAMS CODE
ANNOTATED (1934) §7831; TEXAS, VERNON'S ANNOTATED STATUTES, Art. 6573a,
§22; WASHINGTON, REMINGTON'S REvIsD STATUTES ANNOTATED, §5825.
12 WIS. STATS. (1953) §§240.06, 240. 08.
"3 ALABAMA, CODE OF 1940, Title 20, §3; ALASKA, COMPILED LAWS OF 1933, §4315;
ARIZONA, CODE OF 1939, §58-101; CALIFORNIA, DEERING'S CIVIL CODE (1937)
§1624; DELAWARE, REVISED CODE OF 1935, §3106; HAWAII, REv. LAWS OF 1935,
§3900; IDAHO, CODE ANNOTATED (1932) §16-505; ILLINOIS, SMrrH-HuRD, ANN.
STAT., Ch. 59, §2; KANSAS, GEN. STAT. (1935), §33-106; MICHIGAN, STATUTES
ANNOTATED, Ch. 261, §26.908; MINNESOTA, STATUTES OF 1941, §513.05; MISSISSIPPI, CODE OF 1930, ANNOTATED, §3343; MISSOURI, REVISED STATUTES (1939)
21 ARKANSAS, DIGEST OF STATUTES

401 (3222);
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to continue the double standard in effect. The writer's purpose here is
to examine the various considerations supporting and opposing the
double standard, both in theory and in legal operation.
Under the original English Statute, as under various Statutes in this
country, the broad availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel
tended to reduce, though probably not to eliminate, the opportunities for
fraud arising out of the agency situation. The specific provisions tending
to accomplish this result was that allowing contracts dealing with
realty to be executed by orally authorized agents. Thus, since the door
was open for wider pleas of equitable estoppel against a principal invoking the Statute of Frauds, some of the harshness that would result
from a strict enforcement of the Statute could be softened. This was
true because equity, faced with a conveyance that was void because
executed by an agent with only parol authority, could, provided the
necessary equities prevailed, treat the instrument as a contract to convey
and enforce it against a principal attempting to abuse the Statute."4
It is apparent, however, that this situation was extremely contradictory since the plain and obvious requirements of the Statute could be
circumvented by the manipulation of another part of the Statute in
equity.
The New York revision of 183015 brought into being in that state
a Statute which declared contracts not conforming to its provisions
void,' 6 as distinguished from voidable, but which retained the original
Statute's double standard with respect to authorization of agents. The
applicability of defenses of equitable estoppel to pleas of the Statute of
Frauds was by no means terminated by this revision, but the situations
in which such plea was available were no doubt reduced in scope. As a
consequence, the Statute produced under the New York revision
tended to preserve the self-contradictory nature of the double standard
that existed under the English Statute.
Wisconsin borrowed its Statute practically verbatim from New
York" and borrowed with it the apparently contradictory features of
the statute. As our law now appears to stand, an agent whose authorization rests merely in parol may validly contract on behalf of his
§3354; NERsAKA, COMPILED STATUTES (1929), §36-408; NEW HAMPsHIRE, REVISED LAWS OF 1942, Ch. 383, §1; NORTH DAKOTA, CoMPILED LAWS OF 1913,
§5963; OKLAHOMA, STATUTES ANNOTATED, Tit. 15. §136; OREoN, ComP=D
LAWS ANNOTATED (1940) §2-909; SOUTH DAKOTA, CODE OF 1939, §10.0605;
UTAH, ANNOTATED CODE OF 1943, §33-5-5; VRMoNT, PtuBxc LAWS (1933),

Chap. 73, §1675.
14 Griffen v. Baust, 28 App. Div. 553, 50

N.Y.S. 905 (1898). Dreutzer v. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 592, 17 N.W. 423 (1883).
15 N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW, §259 (1930).
16 "A contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale,
of any real property, or an interest therein, is void, unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the lessor or grantor, or by his lawfully authorized agent." Ibid.
17 Ws. STATS. (1953) §§240.06, 240.08.
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principal so as to bind the principal in equity. 18 If specific performance
is brought against the principal, he can be compelled to convey legal
title, assuming that other equitable considerations do not prevent such
decree. 19 On the other hand, if the orally authorized agent should
presume to execute a present conveyance, the conveyance itself is
void, 0 and the opposite party is left the meager possibility of inducing
2
equity to treat the void writing as an equitable contract to convey. '
There is a second respect in which the use of a double standard
tends to bring the two sections of the Statute into conflict with each
other. No clear or positively definite line of demarcation can be drawn
between "present conveyances and "contracts" to convey in futuro.
That a deed, of itself, represents a present conveyance is clear, 22 and
the same may be said, with slightly greater reservation, of a mortgage.2
It is not unheard of, nevertheless, that a court of equity, faced with a
deed void under the Statute of Frauds, elects to treat the instrument as
an equitable contract to convey, thereby escaping the statutory pro24
hibition.
25
On the other hand it is not nearly so definite that the land contract,
or the option,2 6 may not constitute a present conveyance of an equitable
interest, and thereby partake, at least equitably, of the nature of a
present transfer.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to have given cognizance to
this principle in the case of an option. Although it was strenuously
urged by the optionee throughout the trial, appeal and motion for rehearing that authorization to execute the option was governed by Section 240.08 because it was a mere contract to convey, the argument was
ignored in favor of the application of Section 240.06, which deals with
present conveyances. 27 A land contract, the conditions of which have
been partially or fully performed by the purchaser, vests sufficient
equitable title in the purchaser, even for purposes of creating dower in
sDodge v. Hopkins,
(1869); Brown v.
Thompson & Flieth
Rose, 264 Wis. 286,

19 Ibid.

14 Wis. 686 (1861); Smith v. Armstrong, 24 Wis. 446
Griswold, 109 Wis. 275, 85 N.W. 363 (1901); Heins v.
Lumber Co., 165 Wis. 563, 163 N.W. 173 (1917) ; Zuhak v.
58 N.W. 2d 693 (1952).

20

Wyman v. Utech, 256 Wis. 234, 40 N.W. 2d 378 (1949) ; on rehearing 42 N.W.
2d 603 (1950).
21 Griffen v. Baust, note 14, supra.
2226 C.J.S., Deeds §1, p. 173.
23 Davis v. Dunnett, supra, note 3.
24

"A sealed instrument purporting to convey an interest in land for consideration, but ineffective as a conveyance because executed by an agent not authorized under seal, constitutes a memorandum of a contract to convey which,
if sufficiently definite and the agent is otherwise properly authorized, satisfies
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds."

Comment a. on Subsection (1) (1933).
252 DEPAUL L. REv. 296.
26Wyman v. Utech, supra, note 20.
27 Ibid.
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the purchaser's widow.2 The same is not, apparently, true of a similar
contract upon which purchaser stands in default, 20 but, even in such
cases, purchaser may have sufficient equity upon which to base a claim
30
of homestead.
In the case of licenses, it would appear that ordinarily oral authorization would be sufficient in any case; because where nothing beyond a
mere license is contemplated, no interest in land is proposed to be
created, and thus, the Statute of Frauds has no application. 1
Even more anomalous though, is the lease, which falls within the
Statute governing "present" conveyances in many jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, if its term exceeds one year. That such an instrument
partakes simultaneously of the nature of a present conveyance of an
estate for years and of the nature of a contractual undertaking to
render such term on payment of rents has often been decided.3 2 A
contract to make a contract is ordinarily unenforceable.3 3 Nevertheless
a contract to lease for a term exceeding one year (necessarily including
the contractual aspects of the promised lease) is valid under the
Statute if it is reduced to writing and is signed by the prospective
lessor or his "lawfully authorized" agent.3 4 An attempted lease which
fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 240.06 is there declared
void. Notwithstanding, equity may treat the transaction as a contract
to lease,35 thereby permitting oral authorization of the same agent, and
validating the very transaction which the Statute declared void. Though
it has been decided by at least one court that if the shortcoming of the
instrument is that the lessor's agent was not authorized by a written
power, equity will not treat the lease as a contract to make a lease,3 6
little basis is seen for such a decision; and there is substantial authority
for asserting that courts not bound by a poorly reasoned precedent (as
37
the Ohio court was) treat such leases as contracts for a lease.
Assuming, however, that we can properly classify these various instruments into present conveyances and mere contracts dealing with
real estate, so that the effect of their execution by agents can be distinguished on the basis of the manner in which the agents were authorized, it remains to be determined how and to what extent the problem alluded to in the foregoing can be ameliorated through legislation.
To avoid self-contradiction of the Statute, only two legislative
2866 A.L.R., Dower, §11, Note II, p.65 and Note III b., p.69 .

A.L.R., Do'wer, §11, Note III a., p.67.
Chopin v. Runte, 75 Wis. 361, 44 N.W. 258 (1890) ; 89 A.L.R. 511.
Sweeney v. Bird, 293 Mich. 624, 292 N.W. 506 (1940).

2966
30
3

1
3224 WORDS AND PHRASES, PERM. ED., 472 et seq. (1940).

3 Wallace v. Mertz, 86 Ind. App. 185, 156 N.E. 562 (1927).
1 WIS. STATS. (1953) §240.08.
J. J. Newberry Co. v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 973 (1942); Cress v. Switzer,
Ariz.
. '150 P2d 86 (1944).
38
Hodesh v. Hallerman, 45 Ohio App. 278, 186 N.E. 921 (1933).
3

35

a Cases cited at 37 C.J.S., Frauds,Statute of, §213, p. 710, footnote 54.
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policies appear to be open: (1) to relax the Statute of Frauds itself,
presumably to the point of allowing exceptions to its provisions such
as are contained in Wisconsin, Section 121.04, where, under the Sales
Act, transactions are freed from avoidability by acceptance of part of
the goods of payment of something "in earnest" or as part payment as
well as by "some note or memorandum in writing."-" It is safe to say
that it would be preposterous to require a writing for real estate transactions entered into by the contracting parties in pro. per., while dispensing with the necessity of written authorization for their agents conducting identical transactions. So only one other possibility remains:
(2) to require the agent's authority to be evidenced by a writing whereever the transaction itself is required to be written.
New York, by a revision of its Statute adopted in 1934,39 adopted
the second course. It would appear that in so doing, that state has
elected not only to eliminate the double-standard of agency appointment, with its contradictory results, but also to reaffirm and strengthen
the public policy out of which grew the original Statute of Frauds.
It is readily apparent, however, that under the single-standard
Statute, the equitable pleas of the party who dealt with an agent lacking written authorization are far less available than under any variation of the double-standard Statute. Here it will avail equity nothing
to construe a conveyance as a contract to convey because the same dignity is required for authorization of agents in either case.
We must consider, though, that after nearly three centuries of
acquaintance with the Statute's requirements that real estate transactions be written, the bona fides of one who pleads his ignorance of
that requirement is difficult to understand. His position in equity is
considerably weakened by his culpable ignorance, to the point where he
may, perhaps with some justice, be treated as a willing victim of fraud.
Nonetheless, it may be confidently assumed that, wherever a plea of
the Statute would cripple strong and substantial equities in favor of
the opposite party, equity will intervene to prevent such misuse of the
Statute, because it has become practically a maxim of equity that "the
Statute of Frauds may not be used as an instrument of fraud."4 0
When circumstances prevail where an agent is sufficiently clothed
with authority and where a party dealing with him is sufficiently free
from fraud and from negligence in discovering the defective authorization, equity will intervene and hold that a purported principal is
estopped, in one way or another, to deny the fact of authorization, in
41
spite of the Statute of Frauds.
38
39
40
41

WIS. STATS. (1953) §121.04.
N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW, §259 (1934).
POMEROY, op. cit. supra, note 1.

Cress v. Switzer, supra, note 35 citing 19 AM. JuR. 743.
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For instance, P orally directs A to convey Blackacre. Realizing the
necessity of sealed authorization, P telephones to T, the prospective
purchaser, that A has been authorized under seal. A does not have apparent authority to execute a deed, but P is estopped to deny A's au42
thority if T purchases the land relying upon P's statement.
One class of cases lending support to this proposition are those in
which a true owner of land, who stands by and allows an apparent
owner of his land to convey it, is estopped to assert his title against the
innocent grantee. 43 Thus, we can reason that if an owner of land can
clothe another with apparent title and be estopped to deny the conveyance, another ominer should be estopped to deny the fact of authorization where an agent with apparent (but sufficient) authority executes a
conveyance on his behalf. It is difficult to see why there would be any
less an obligation to check the title of an owner of land than there would
be to check the authority of an agent.
That there exists little if any legally significant difference in apparent title to and apparent authority over land is clearly illustrated in
the language of a New Jersey case.
"Where an owner of lands holds out another, or permits that
other to hold himself out, as having power of disposition thereover, innocent third persons who are thus led into dealing with
the person having such a apparent power of disposition will be
protected in equity, but the rule operates only to protect those
who exercise ordinary caution, and it is essential that the conduct of party against whom an estoppel is claimed did clearly
amount to44the clothing of another with title to, or authority over,
the land."
It also appears that where a conveyance would otherwise fail because of the insufficient authorization of the agent executing it, such
conveyance can be made effectual by a ratification by the purported
principal, 5 though perhaps not where the statute makes such conveyances void, where ratification is not possible." Notwithstanding, if
a purported principal is 'Willing to ratify, it is obvious that he is not
attempting to use the Statute as an instrument of fraud, and thus, the
principle of ratification drops from further-consideration here.
Reasoning negatively, it has been held that the mere taking of possession will not take an act of an unauthorized agent in conveying
(leasing) realty out of the Statute of Frauds.47 The opinion in this
42 RsTATEMENT, AGENCY,

43 10

R.C.L. 780.

§28 and §31 (1933).

44Bright v. Forest Hill Park Development Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 170, 31 A.2d 190
(1943).
4537 C.J.S., Frauds,Statute of, §214, p. 711.
46 Jefferson v. Kern, 219 Mich. 294, 189 N.W. 195 (1922).
47Woodworth et al v. Franklin
Okla._, 204 P. 452 (1921).
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case indicates, however, that something more than mere possession will
suspend the operation of the statute.
We can conclude, then, that the force of equity is not completely
proscribed by even the strictest form of the single-standard Statute.
Does this mean that a Statute such as New York presently has, comparatively strict and unyielding in its requirement, would soon, like the
hearsay rule of evidence, come to be known far more by its exceptions
than by its rule; or might it be reasoned with equal force that while the
double standard of agency remained in force, there was considerable
room for argument that the statute implied a legislative policy of
leniency, but that now the courts must rule that the door has deliberately been closed to equitable interposition except in the clearest cases of
fraud? With New York's present single and strengthened standard,
there can be little room to question the legislative determination that
no interest in land shall pass without writing and signature, and that
only the strongest equities will suffice to take the case out of the
Statute. 48
Although the original Statute provided for two standards and although valid arguments support that position, it would appear that the
policy behind the Statute can best be protected only by the strict enforcement of the single-standard Statute, requiring written authorization for agents in all cases affecting an interest in real estate; provided,
of course, that the principles of equity will be available to prevent
abuse of the Statutes.
It is the writer's belief that New York's action, now twenty years
past, was a wise one, and one which might well be emulated by Wisconsin and by other jurisdictions which still tend to regard the Statute
of Frauds in an attitude of suspicion and distrust. Such an action
would seem to do much to clear the air respecting our dominant policy
regarding real estate transactions, and to lend to such policy the strong
teeth which it has not had for many centuries.
W. URBAN ZIEVERS

4s Rork v. Orcutt, 53 N.Y.S. 354 (1945).

